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SOVEREIGNTY. AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD. By Bertrand de
Jouvenel. Translated by J. F. Huntington. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. xiv, 320. $4.50.
ANY study of sovereignty must face the paradox of political and legal obliga-
tion. This paradox can be very simply put: laws are made by, yet they measure,
men. Their man-made character is obvious. It is equally evident that in any
judicial decision, particularly in a criminal case in which the defendant is
sentenced to death, the laws of political and legal science measure men. How
is it possible for man thus to be measured by something which he himself
makes? Does it not almost verge on the self-contradictory for man to make
something which obligates him, as in the foregoing example, to eliminate
himself from existence?
The paradox appears in a more technical form when stated in terms of the
methods of natural science. As is evident from the example of the criminal
case, the laws of political and legal science are normative in the sense that they
prescribe an "ought" to which the criminal is obligated to conform; they do
not conform to the "is" of his de facto behavior. The situation is like that of
an astronomer who, having a theory that planets move about the sun in rec-
tangular orbits, upon finding the facts to be that planets move in eliptical orbits,
nevertheless preserved the laws of his initial theory by affirming that facts
out of accord with rectangular orbital motion ought not to be, and then, as
if even this were not enough, proceeded to remove the orbital motions. Certainly
one would take a rather dim view of the scientific claims of such an astronomer
and his laws of planetary motion. Yet, the behavior and laws of such an
astronomer are precisely like those of the political and legal scientist and the
judge. How, then, can politics and law be called sciences? But if the laws
of these social subjects are not scientific, having no objective reference by
which one can significantly say they are empirically confirmed and hence
generally valid, even for the criminal, why is there any obligation upon the
criminal or anybody else to accept their authority and to be measured by them?
Why can they not be ignored and dismissed after the manner of any arbitrarily
stipulated or fanciful hypothesis in the natural sciences which is out of accord
with the facts?
The importance of De Jouvenel's recent study is that it directs itself to
these paradoxical questions, even though the author has not put his problem
in such a form. To this undertaking he brings an exceptional background. As
president of an economic research institute in Paris, he is not unmindful of the
inductive data of the social sciences and the methods of empirical science. A
Frenchman who, like any student educated in France, has read the mathe-
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matical physicist and philosopher Descartes, he knows further that science is
not merely the observation and collection of facts but also the description,
analysis and interpretation of these facts in terms of a theory so precisely stated
that what it affirms is both clear and distinct. Any theory purporting to be
scientific may seem, to uncritical and unprecise minds, to fit the facts and hence
to be a scientific theory if it is stated in indistinct terms; for vagueness permits
the theory to be stretched or interpreted to fit any facts. Only by requiring
clarity and distinctness in the statement of a scientific theory can any appeal to
facts possibly show the theory to be confirmed or false. De Jouvenel is well
aware that such a clearly stated theory is just as important as the gathering of
inductive data if politics and law are to merit being called sciences. Further-
more, except for American legal realism, he has a technical knowledge of the
major traditional and contemporary ethical and legal theories and the philoso-
phers from which each derives. Finally, he appreciates the semantic and logical
issues that are inescapable in judging the merits of any ethical, legal or political
theory, even though his study does not exhibit the mastery of philosophical
analysis or symbolic logic necessary to a decisive resolution of these issues.
Clearly, a study with such range of approach and competence demands
serious attention. Its niain thesis is that the foregoing paradoxes are real
only for certain ethical, legal and political theories. The theories for which
the paradoxes are not resolvable, however, are those concerning political
sovereignty which modern political and legal science has come to accept. Hence,
the paradoxes can be resolved only by correcting the theoretical assumptions
of traditional modern political and legal science.
Let no one suppose that De Jouvenel's conclusions are of merely academic
interest. The initial thesis of his entire study is that modern theoretical
errors in the social sciences are taking even the liberal democratic peoples
of the free world to tyranny. His reading of medieval and modern history,
supported with references to the texts, is that the modern world has substituted,
both in theory and increasingly in fact, a tyranny of the political legislative
sovereign over the individual for a supposed tyranny of the medieval political
monarch which, in theory and to a real extent in fact, never existed. This has
occurred through a jurisprudential definition of the word "just," after the
manner of the positivistic Hobbes and Austin, as the will of the political sov-
ereign which the scientific jurist merely declares, and the consequent affirma-
tion that an unjust political sovereign cannot exist.
So far as the United States is concerned, this analysis means that there is no
contemporary theory of politics and law more incompatible with the basic
results of De Jouvenel's study than legal positivism. This theory, introduced
into the United States by Thayer of the Harvard Law School and expounded
recently by Judge Learned Hand in his Holmes lectures on the bill of rights
at the same school,' is represented by that group of Justices of the Supreme
Court who have been referred to in the press as centering around Mr. Justice
1. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
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Frankfurter. 2 De Jouvenel's analysis cuts, therefore, to the heart of the con-
temporary philosophical issue between the Frankfurter school and the position
represented by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas. This
philosophical issue concerns the proper interpretation of the bill of rights in
civil liberty cases.
The philosophy of the Chief Justice's group is that in the case of civil liberties,
the bill of rights is to be interpreted as law. From this it follows that if the
political sovereign-the democratically elected legislature-passes a statute
affecting individual civil liberties whose substance is incompatible with the bill
of rights, a federal judge who has sworn to uphold the Constitution must
declare the statute unconstitutional. Clearly this is a philosophy in which the
political sovereign, as well as any one of his subjects, is measured by the law.
The philosophy of the other group, as unequivocally stated by Hobbes, Austin
and Learned Hand, is that law is the will or command of the political sovereign
and hence to talk about an unjust political sovereign is self-contradictory. It
follows, as Hobbes, Austin and Hand make equally clear, that the political
sovereign can place no legal restrictions whatever upon himself and, as Hand
states with respect to civil liberties as well as new social legislation, that the bill
of rights must be interpreted not as law but merely as "admonitions to forbear-
ance,"'3 mere moral advice to the legislative majority. Consequently, should
the political sovereign ignore the moral advice by passing a statute affecting
civil liberties incompatible with the bill of rights, federal courts must declare
this statute to be law.
Concretely, the difference between these two philosophies is this: if in a
burst of religious fervor, not to mention demagoguery, the democratic political
sovereign or one of his vaguely authorized committee investigators made it a
crime, or interpreted his legislative authorization as making it a crime, for a
person to have the religious belief of, let us say, a Quaker, the philosophy of
Warren, Black and Douglas requires them to interpret this statute as unconsti-
tutional; whereas the philosophy of Hobbes, Austin, Hand-and Frankfurter
when he can morally stomach his Harvard Law School legal positivism-
requires the judge to declare the legislature's statute and its committeeman's
behavior law. It is precisely the latter philosophy of political and legal institu-
tions to which De Jouvenel refers when he says that it puts the sovereign com-
pletely above the law and thereby carries the modern world to tyranny.
De Jouvenel demonstrates also that acceptance of this modern positivistic
philosophy of government and law has led modern legal historians to a com-
pletely false account of the medieval monarch's status before the law. This
erroneous historical account portrays the medieval ruler, like the modern legal
positivist's political sovereign, as completely above the law. De Jouvenel shows
that the historical documents simply do not support this thesis. To be sure, the
2. See Krvck, Justice Brennan as a New 'Swing Man,' N.Y. Times, April 3, 1958,
p. 30, col. 5. See also Lewis, Conflict in the Court, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1958, p. 17, col. 2.
3. HAND, THE SPIRIT oF LmERT 204 (1953).
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medieval monarch had more legislative rights than his subjects, but those
legal rights his subjects did possess the ruler could not touch if he were to be
legally just.
At this point, the reader may well grant the theoretical accuracy of De
Jouvenel's evaluation but question its significance as a matter of medieval
practice. The author answers by pointing to the patent fact of the "fortunate
powerlessness of kings." 4 He means that a king is merely a single person, quite
unlike the modern legislature whose majority is able to brush individual rights
of dissenters aside and to draw increasing physical power to itself. Thus,
where the modern individual is helpless before the absolute theoretical power
and majority physical power of the political sovereign, the medieval political
sovereign, being only one person, had to enter into a contractual agreement
with his subjects under which, in return for their physical support of him, he
guaranteed protection of those legal rights in the contract which were theirs.
In this sense, De Jouvenel's book is one of the strongest recent arguments for a
constitutional monarch that I have read.
It does not follow, however, that this is De Jouvenel's political theory. In
fact, he does not advocate a constitutional monarchy even though it is prefer-
able to a democratic tyranny. But he does make clear that in moving from the
medieval monarch to the modern, legally positivistic, democratic and political
community, we have gained greater democracy with respect to the legislative
character of the political sovereign at the very grave cost of putting the abso-
lutely sovereign legislature completely above the law and transforming it into
an unqualified tyrant so far as the civil liberties and other personal rights of
minority groups, dissenters, or the individual are concerned.
This tyranny does not affect merely those who disagree with the substantive
content of majority-approved statutes of the legislative political sovereign.
When the legislative majority in a burst of enthusiasm, again not to mention
demagoguery, makes illegal certain personal, religious or political beliefs, or
even scientifically verified conclusions about foreign countries, the individual
legislator's freedom of choice in any future voting risks intimidation. When
this occurs, the vote of the majority becomes spurious, democratic in name
only. This is precisely why the majority votes in tyrannical governments today,
which show 981 per cent of the electorate in support of the government in
any election or legislative action, are correctly taken as spurious. Tyranny is
no less tyrannical when fathered by a "democratic" legislature. There is no
escape, therefore, from De Jouvenel's conclusion that to put the political sov-
ereign above the law, even if that political sovereign be identified with the
majority in a democratically elected legislature, is to have tyranny.
Although he does not refer to the John Locke of Essays on the Law of
Nature, A Letter Concerning Toleration and the political classic, Of Civil
Governmnent, or to Jefferson and the founding fathers of the United States'
political and legal institutions, we can now see why all these men insisted,
4. P. 204.
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against Hobbes, that a political sovereign, even a democratically constituted
political sovereign, cannot legally do certain things without contradicting the
very reason for its existence.5 The sovereign, for example, cannot foreclose
an individual's legal right to his own religious belief or his elemental freedom
to express his honest beliefs and convictions in his voting. We can also under-
stand why Jefferson and Marshall, having seen the tyranny of democratic
political sovereigns in Europe, witnessed demagoguery in the Virginia legis-
lature and, in Marshall's case, seen the mob stone General Washington, feared
a tyranny of the legislative branch of the government as much as a tyranny
of the executive or judiciary.6 Clear, too, is the reason why Jefferson and the
founding fathers insisted upon a "mixed" government of checks and balances
in which political sovereignty, not to be trusted in a single department, was
distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, so that the
limited sovereignty of one branch could serve as a check upon any tendency of
another branch to usurp absolute power. Such considerations undoubtedly
motivated Jefferson, upon receiving the first draft of the Constitution of the
United States, to write President Washington and his friend Madison, insist-
ing that a bill of rights must be added. For without a bill of rights interpreted
as law, of which the judiciary is custodian, the natural tendency of a legislative
majority to usurp absolute power remains unchecked. In moments of unre-
flective fear or enthusiasm, the legislature can gradually strip the individual of
his personal beliefs and liberties by proscribing certain ideas. The essence,
consequently, of the mixed theory of democratic government is that a bill of
rights interpreted merely as moral advice, important as it is, is not enough.
Viewed in these terms, the philosophy of Warren, Douglas and Black with
respect to civil liberties can be described as follows: their legal philosophy
extends to the modem democratic political sovereign the same measurement
by law to which the medieval political sovereign was subject. Their legal
philosophy of civil liberties is the same as that of the American founding
fathers.
The reasons for De Jouvenel's rejection of medieval religious, political and
legal institutions, notwithstanding their measurement of the political sovereign
by law, are equally important. His reasons provide part at least of the resolution
of the paradoxes of political and legal obligation.
The error of medieval legal thinking was its supposition, following Plato
and the medieval Christian church, and also St. Thomas, that: (a) there is only
one cognitive theory of the content of the legal norms which measure both the
political sovereign and his subjects; and (b) all men using cognitive scientific
and philosophic methods must come to the same conclusion about what this
theory is. This supposition brought about a tyranny of a different, but nonethe-
5. In this connection see Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952) (dis-
senting opinion by Douglas, J.).




less patently evil, kind. If any man using cognitive scientific and philosophical
methods can know with certainty the single scientifically-verified philosophical
theory which defines the content of the norms which in turn define a just political
sovereign, then anyone who dissents from this absolutely certain orthodox
doctrine is cognitively unscientific and hence, in this sense, immoral. Of this
belief was born the medieval inquisition, as today the tyranny of Communists
with their absolute certainty of the one and only true doctrine. The error both
of the present Communists and of the medieval theory of the just sovereign
is that the finite human mind, using cognitive scientific and philosophical
methods, simply does not have the capacity to arrive with complete certitude
at the unique theory of the normative goal of all ethical, political and legal
endeavor.
De Jouvenel sees, therefore, that modern ethical, legal and political theory
and practice, for all its reinforcement of tyranny, has something to teach the
Western mind. Because of the finiteness of human knowledge, even the most
rigorous and empirically inclusive scientific and philosophical theories account
for only some of the facts of nature and human experience; hence, there are
multiple reasonable theories of the facts of nature and the intrinsic goal values
of political, moral and legal action. A theory of good government and just
law for measuring the political sovereign and his subjects which is in accord
with scientific and philosophical cognitive methods must therefore have the
content of an open pluralistic, not a closed monistic and monolithic, society.
Here, he agrees with Professor Karl Popper and the thesis of the latter's The
Open Society and Its Enemies. The second lesson of modern ethical, legal and
political theory is the necessity for the subjective "for-me-ness" of any ethical
and legal norm. Unless an ethical and legal rule is my norm, its ethical and
legal obligation has no meaning with respect to me. There is no meaning,
also, to my obligation to accept it as a measurement of me. This is the truth
of contemporary existential philosophy and the major contribution to Western
religious, political and legal theory of the Protestant Reformation. From the re-
quired "for-me-ness" of any legal norm which obligates me to be measured by it,
follows the necessity that a law measuring one and all have its basis in the
consent of one and all. In short, the obligatory character of law logically
implies an implicit contract.
It is an error, therefore, as De Jouvenel notes, to interpret the natural-law
theory which roots law in an initial contract freely made by its subjects, as
an empirical proposition about an actual 'historical event. Instead, the con-
tractual theory of the origin of government and law is the logical prerequisite of
any obligation of its subjects to be measured by any political and legal system.
Without a contract, explicit or implicit, the political sovereign is a tyrant
outside the law, and without the logically implicit consent of all to the contract,
the contract's norms bind neither sovereign nor subject. This assent, to be
sure, may be given only implicitly through one's acceptance of the social norms
endorsed by the society in which one is immersed and by one's insistence upon
the protection of the law should another violate one's own legal rights. Thus,
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the murderer sent to the electric chair may not at the moment consent to what is
being done to him, but that same murderer would undoubtedly appeal to the law
of his country in cases where the law favors his actions, or were anyone else
to do to his own wife or children what he did to his victim.
Much more is involved than the implicit, or what the anthropologists call the
covert, norms of one's own culture. To make this clear, however, would require
an analysis of the technical meaning of Sir Henry Maine's distinction between
the law of "contract" and the law of "status"7 and exceed the limitations of
De Jouvenel's study.
His findings nevertheless suggest a technical theory of law. It is best ap-
proached by a consideration of Kelsen's improvement over the legal positivism
of Hobbes, Austin and Hand and by analysis of the problems left by Kelsen's
version of modem legal positivism. Kelsen saw quite correctly that Austin's
legal positivism failed to provide the theoretical assumptions necessary to send
the criminal to the electric chair even when the criminal's actual behavior did
not conform to the political sovereign's commands and the political sovereign
had physical power to bring pain or evil upon a dissenter. Educated on the
European continent, Kelsen had learned from Kant, as recent Anglo-American
ethical and legal theorists have learned from Hume, that a syllogistic conclusion
which is a measuring and an imperative sentence cannot be derived from
premises which are indicative sentences merely describing what is. In Hume's
well known words:
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,
'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it."
It is Kelsen's great merit to have seen, and this is the point of his essay,
"Causality and Imputation," that precisely the foregoing fallacy, noted by
Kant as well as Hume, occurs in every judicial judgment interpreted accord-
ing to Anglo-American Austinian legal positivism or American legal realism.
The judge's concluding statement which sends the murderer to the electric chair
is most obviously an imperative ought or obligatory sentence, yet all that
Austinian legal positivism or American legal realism give the judge for his
premises are indicative sentences scientifically describing an "is." In the
7. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 181-82 (1930).
8. 2 HUMiE, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 245-46 (Green & Grose ed. 1874).
9. Kelsen, Causality and Imputation, in WHAT is JUsTIcE 324 (1957).
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Holmesian predictive version of American legal realism, the indicative sentences
of the judge's or the legal scientist's premises are merely a predicted "is"
inferred from a present "is"; in the view of Austin and Judge Hand, the
indicative sentences are merely the statutes handed to the judge by the political
sovereign who is above the law and the "is" of the sovereign's physical power to
inflict pain on those who disagree with him. Clearly, from such indicative
sentences one cannot derive the imperative, obligatory language of a court's
judgment.
Kelsen's way of avoiding this fallacy is well known. To remain a legal
positivist and preserve the conception of law as the science of the positive law,
he saw that one basic ethical premise had to be assumed; for without at least
one imperative obligatory sentence in his premises, the judge-if he was a
positivist or American legal realist-could never arrive at imperative, obliga-
tory language in his final judgment. This ethical premise, which Kelsen
called the Grundnorm or "the basic norm," is that "the positive law ought to
be obeyed."'1
One important consequence of including this minimal imperative premise
distinguishes Kelsen's legal positivism from Austin's. Since no mere physical
.'is" can give an "ought," the validity of law centers in its ethical Grundnorm
and not, as for Austin, in the indicative sentence physical power of the political
sovereign to enforce his command. Immediately the policeman's club becomes
not the source of obligation but merely the instrument by which an ethical
"ought" is administered. Forthwith the obligation to be measured by the
positive law laid down in the first constitution is not physical but ethical.
Clearly, De Jouvenel's legal theory is of this ethical kind.
Has either Kelsen or De Jouvenel established his thesis that government and
law are sciences? If De Jouvenel's method of justifying a court's judgment is
like Kelsen's-and De Jouvenel is not clear on this point-he, like Kelsen, pro-
vides the judge with sufficient premises to warrant his uttering the imperative
language of his final judgment. But what of the scientific validity of the two
premises which Kelsen has introduced? Certainly, no theory is customarily
regarded as scientific unless an empirical method for confirming its premises
is provided. Merely to assume such premises and show that they are sufficient
logically to justify the judicial decision is not enough. This inadequacy becomes
evident when one asks the following questions: (1) why the particular ethical,
political and legal philosophy of the norms of the first constitution? (2) how
does one verify empirically the ethical Grundnorm, "the positive law of the
first constitution ought to be obeyed"? (3) does not the very nature of any
imperative sentence, such as "Shoulder arms" or "Go to the electric chair,"
make talk about its empirical truth or falsity nonsensical?
To the first question Kelsen answers in terms of "efficacy." To the third,
he would answer in the affirmative, agreeing with the noncognitivists who
point out that to talk about verifying empirically the imperative sentences of
10. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 111 (1945).
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political or legal science is absurd. In other words, given a goal value, a science
of political and legally instrumental values is meaningful, but a science of in-
trinsic or goal values is not.
Obviously, De Jouvenel's legal and political conclusions will not permit such
answers, for he affirms that a political and legal theory of the normative content
of the first constitution which places the political sovereign above the law in-
volves not merely error but is also "evil." How, then, does he deal with the
three questions posed above?
We can begin by examining his reason for believing any political theory
erroneous that places the political sovereign above the law. He feels that such a
theory commits the error which Whitehead has called the "fallacy of misplaced
concreteness."" This fallacy confuses an abstract constructed entity of thought
with a concrete element of fact. Any reader can prove that the Anglo-American
Austinian legal positivist commits this fallacy by asking a representative of
this school to describe concretely, within the legal system of the United States,
where and what the political sovereign is. Some will locate "him" in the federal
legislature. Others will identify the sovereign's locus as the Congress and
the independent legislatures of the separate states when, as in one method of
constitutional amendment, action is required both by the federal legislature
and a specific number of independent states. On either answer, no Justice of
the Supreme Court, or at least not the legal-positivist minded justice Frank-
furter, should have voted for the Court's decision on segregation in education,
since the government had never passed a statute making it a crime for a
state to prescribe segregated education. On the second interpretation, more-
over, the problem arises of determining where sovereignty lies in a conflict
of judgment between the state legislatures and the federal government. To avoid
this difficulty, still other legal positivists will locate the political sovereign in the
members of the original constitutional convention. Others will find it, contrary
to Austin, in the American people as a whole. These different answers show
quite clearly that De Jouvenel is correct when he refers to the legal positivists'
political sovereign as a fictive entity. He is correct also when he speaks of
"the fictive person in whose name we are governed.' 1 2
It should be noted, however, that law cannot meet the social needs of today's
world without fictive entities. Any modern corporation is such an entity. So
is any modern state when considered as a political and legal institution.
Similarly, mathematical physics would not have attained its present dimensions
without fictive entities, or what contemporary theoretical physicists and phi-
losophers of science call "constructs." The error is not, as De Jouvenel suggests,
in the introduction of theoretically constructed entities, for their introduction
constitutes the genius of Western mathematical physics and of Western legal
science in its law of contract form. Error arises only when properties appro-
priate for concrete entities are assigned to legal constructs, and conversely.
What he should have said, therefore, is that the legal positivist's political




sovereign is a legal construct. Had he done so, he would have made his case
even more decisively. For the scientific meaning of any constructed scientific
object is precisely that it has no theoretical meaning apart from the axiomatic-
ally proposed laws which constitute its construction. Hence, once it is noted
that the modern legal positivist's political sovereign is a constructed rather than
concrete legal entity, talk about such a legal sovereign being above the law is
self-contradictory.
Contemporary Anglo-American law contains many muddles because of the
failure of judges, lawyers and law teachers to distinguish between concrete
entities which do have a legal meaning apart from the legal rules in which they
appear as instances and constructed legal entities which do not. This error
has been prevalent in British and American corporation law.13 The mistakes
of the pre-1932 Supreme Court in declaring unconstitutional child labor laws
affecting fictive legal entities similarly stem from the confusion of rights of
concrete individuals to their own religious and political beliefs, which exist
antecedent to the construction of any political or legal institution, with legally
constructed entities and their rights, and in attributing to the latter the pre-
scriptive rules of the bill of rights which are appropriate 6nly to the former.
The foregoing demonstration of the way in which cognitive knowledge and
distinctions in epistemology and in the philosophy of natural science enable
one to choose in a cognitively significant manner among differing theories of
the norms of a first constitution is exceedingly important. It suggests that the
criterion of the prescriptive, imperative measuring sentences of the social sciences
is scientifically verified theory of that which is epistemologically meaningful
in other sciences. Curiously, however, De Jouvenel misses this point, just as
he confuses the use of fictive entities with their abuse.
Another clue to his method of making the imperative measuring sentences of
politics and law scientifically verifiable appears near the beginning of his study
in this sentence: "We reject utterly both . . . theories [of political association]
-- domination from without and voluntary association; our own theory is that
of association brought about by the summons of a man."' 4 By the former of
the two rejected theories he means legal positivism and its affirmation that law
is just solely because it is the will of a political sovereign having the external
physical power to enforce his commands. By the theory of voluntary asso-
ciation he means the thesis that people converge spontaneously and disjunctive-
ly to create a political and legal system whose authority they accept as the
normative measurement of themselves. His own theory is that voluntary
association happens only under the leadership of one or a very few men who,
by the vigor and decisiveness of their personalities and by debate and other
means, persuade the people to accept the leader's proposed norms as their own.
Jefferson is an American example. This, I take it, would be De Jouvenel's
answer to our Kelsenian question: why the first constitution?
13. I am indebted to my colleague on the faculty of the Yale Law School, Professor
Francis W. Coker, Jr., for calling this development to my attention.
14. P. 29.
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By his thesis, also, the norms of the first constitution retain their efficacy only
so long as successive leaders of the political community revere the old norms
and embody them and their symbols in their own speech and deeds. The role of
religion in this process of keeping the people receptive to self-measurement by
traditional norms is also noted.
This thesis is a distinct advance over the usual theories of political and
legal obligation. Even so, the crucial question remains and requires an answer
if it is to be maintained that law and politics are sciences and that intrinsic or
goal values as well as instrumental values can be determined by the cognitive
methods of empirical science. The question must be asked: what is the cognitive
method by which the leader, or the few leaders, determine the intrinsic goal
values that are to be put in the first constitution? What also of the imperative
premise, "the positive law of the first constitution ought to be obeyed"?
Again we are back with the inescapable question, whether speaking of an
imperative sentence as empirically true or false is meaningless. If so, is it
not sheer nonsense, as the noncognitivists Stevenson, Ayer, Hfigerstr6m and
Alf Ross maintain, to refer to government and law as sciences?
Certainly there is no government or law without judgments by political and
judicial officials such as: "You ought to have conformed your de facto behavior
to the normative content of the positive law; and since the facts of the case
have established beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not so conform, I
command that you be put to death as the positive law prescribes." Clearly
the latter sentence is imperative and, as Kelsen has shown, can be generalized
for any political or legal decision into the single imputative sentence, "The
positive law ought to be obeyed," and its equivalent imperative sentence,
"Obey the positive law." Now, the cognitive methods of empirical science can
reveal the meaning of the positive articles of the first constitution and the
positive statutes of the present political sovereign. Similarly, empirical scien-
tific methods can determine whether the government has the physical police-
men, jailers and electrical instruments necessary to put the convicted criminal
to death. But what possible meaning is there to asking whether a prescriptive
or imperative sentence such as "Shoulder arms," "Obey the positive law" or
"Go to the electric chair" is empirically true or false, as one must ask if one
claims that the policy decisions of statesmen and the judgments of judges are
validated by the methods of empirical science?
Contemporary sociological jurists, such as Lasswell and McDougal, who
emphasize the centrality of policy-determining decisions in "the political and
legal process," and who at the same time describe their approach as a "policy-
forming science," could well reflect on the foregoing question. 15 If the non-
cognitivists in ethics and law are correct, and sociological jurists have by no
means shown them incorrect, to speak of "policy-forming science" is nonsense,
since the end product of a policy-making political decision, as of any judicial
15. See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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decision, is a prescriptive "ought" imperative sentence, and scientific method
is meaningfully applied only to descriptive indicative sentences.
De Jouvenel is aware of the noncognitivists' thesis; he explicitly distin-
guishes indicative from imperative sentences and faces the difficulty which this
distinction raises. His method of preserving the cognitive character of politics
and law is not clear, however.
Sometimes he suggests that the method of preservation is that of an em-
pirical study of history. But clearly, historical method produces merely indica-
tive sentences about a sequence of past instances of an "is"; it cannot give a
prescriptive "ought to be." Nor does it provide any criterion for saying, as
he does, that the medieval theory of the relation of the political sovereign to
law is "more true" or "better than" modern positivistic theory. One theory
is as well confirmed by the empirical methods of historical science as the other.
He states also, again following his historical method, that "it would be a
mistake to regard these theories as causes; they are, more truly, conse-
quences."' 6 But if this is the case, each theory of sovereignty had to be and
we are left again with nothing but an "is." On this basis, it is meaningless to
talk about the theory of sovereignty being either true or false or good or bad
since facts merely are. Truth or falsity are predicates of propositions, not of
causally determined facts considered independently of the propositions which
describe them. If theories of government and law are merely the effect of a
causally antecedent historical "is" rather than causally significant in determin-
ing the historical "is," one wonders also why De Jouvenel bothers about them
or thinks it so important that his readers realize that one of these theories is
not merely error but also evil. At this point, he might profit by a reading of
Professor Karl Popper's later book, The Poverty of History.
In part II--"The Political Good"--De Jouvenel seems to employ a different
method. There he defines a "good" sovereign as one who tends to the public
good.17 But is not this definition obviously circular? He thinks not. When a
person affirms that an object of ethical, political or legal judgment is politically
good, De Jouvenel explains, he is affirming not merely the subjective psycho-
logical fact that "I approve of the object x," but also that this approval is
made with respect to an objective constant k having a cognitive meaning which
is the same for everybody and which, therefore, provides an objective cognitive
criterion of "the political good." He illustrates this by substituting France for
the constant k.
Does this meet the methodological difficulty involved in making his particular
ethical judgments concerning the facts of history scientifically verifiable?
Clearly it does not. Although there is a sense in which France is cognitively
objective, that is, for example, a specific geographical area of Europe, France
in this sense does not provide a norm; it yields a mere empirical "is." Were
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hers of this political community have a common object. On De Jouvenel's own
historical evidence, some Frenchmen believe in a political sovereign subject to
law, while others, following Descartes, Hobbes and Rousseau, believe in a
political sovereign whose commands cannot, logically, be characterized as un-
just. Thus, the author seems to verify his normative political, ethical and legal
judgments with respect to the historical "is" only through surreptitiously
shifting from France in the sense of the denotative geographical "is," which
can be shown to be objective by the methods of empirical science, to France
in the sense of a normative "ought to be"; and the latter France, on the evidence
of his own historical method, is not objective.
Near the end of his study a still different cognitive method of validating the
prescriptive judgments of ethics, politics and law is suggested. He writes:
"But, if social science has to recognise the power of the image [of the
ideal norm]to modify behaviour in the milieu in which it gets diffused,
its true premise is still the behaviour (as modified) and not the modifying
image."' 8
Clearly, this is legal instrumentalism. The reference to the milieu suggests also
the pragmatic, problematic situation of American legal realism and the living
law of sociological jurisprudence. On the next page he adds:
"Over the whole field of temporal organisation, the image of man most
regarded was the predictable, as we have called it, and not the ideal."'19
The word "predictable" is reminiscent of Holmes. Yet, curiously enough,
nowhere does De Jouvenel evidence any awareness of American legal realism.
But would- such an awareness make any difference? Does the instrumental
pragmatic criterion of scientific confirmation or of Holmes' prediction theory
of ethics, politics and law tear the disguise from political and legal imperative
sentences affirming what ought to be to reveal nothing but indicative sentences?
Obviously not, for reference to, or prediction of, a future "is" can no more
verify a prescriptive imperative political or legal judgment concerning what
ought to be than can empirical reference to a present or a past "is." The pre-
scriptive sentences of government and law do not conform to cultural facts,
past, present or future; they measure such facts.
It appears, therefore, that the methods proposed by De Jouvenel for show-
ing the cognitive truth or falsity of normative imperative measuring sentences
in political decisions and legal judgments fail to accomplish his purpose.
Given his proposed methods, the noncognitivists have made their case, and it
is nonsense to speak of political or legal science; furthermore, most of the
normative judgments of his study are merely De Jouvenel's private imperatives
rather than the empirically established indicative sentences he claims them
to be.





basis of his proposed methods of validating them. Hence, other methods might
establish his claims. Is this the case?
To answer this question would exceed the limitations both of De Jouvenel's
study and this Review. His book does contain two suggestions, however, which
indicate a possible positive answer.
At the beginning of his inquiry, he refers to "the tendency of the modern
mind to think entirely in terms of consequences-never of conditions." 20 How
this statement is to be reconciled with the pragmatic instrumentalism and
predictive theory of ethics, politics and law of his last section is not clear. In
any event, it is clear that if the prescriptive rules of politics and law are to be
cognitively meaningful, their empirical confirmation must occur antecedent to
the social facts and de facto human behavior which they measure; their veri-
fication cannot be based on a consequential appeal to the very facts measured.
Otherwise, the law would have to be changed to conform to the criminal's
de facto behavior.
This clarification permits a more exact criticism of De Jouvenel's attempt to
verify the imperative sentences of politics and law by an empirical appeal to
the "is" of history. His error consists of interpreting the antecedents of the
historical prescriptive theories of government and law in factual and temporal
rather than theoretical and logical terms. Since facts merely are, and are
neither true or false nor good or bad, his empirical historical method cannot
provide, as Kelsen has seen, the required prescriptive "ought to obey the law."
And since facts are causally related, each of his rival medieval and modern
theories of sovereignty had to be--one as much a historical "is" as the other;
and there is no basis for choice between them.
But suppose that the antecedents of the prescriptive sentences of government
and law are theoretical rather than factual, and logical rather than temporal.
Certainly, a theory of the facts can be true or false. It then becomes meaningful
for De Jouvenel to affirm with cogent reasons that one of the theories of
sovereignty is false. Furthermore, if the word "bad" means to err about the
truth of a theory, he may meaningfully affirm that a particular historical re-
lation between the political sovereign and the law, based on a false theory, is
evil.
Nevertheless, meaning does not suffice for empirical verification. A meaning-
ful theory may be false.
Here, a conception of the antecedents of the prescriptive sentences of politics
and law as logical rather than temporal becomes important. The logical ante-
cedents of political and legal prescriptive sentences might be indicative sentences
in a cognitive science such as epistemology, logic, the philosophy of natural
science or natural, as distinct from cultural, psychology. Were this the case, the
persuasive imperative sentences of government and law would be incomplete
and, hence, contain implicit indicative sentences referring for their cognitive
meaning to empirical facts in fields other than the social sciences. The metfiod-
20. P. 9.
19581 1313
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ological paradox of political and legal obligations would then be resolved. As
the implicates of implicit indicative sentences are verified by appeal to facts
other than those which they measure, the prescriptive laws of the social sciences
are cognitive; hence, it is not meaningless to speak of political and legal science.
Thus capable of being implicitly verified logically antecedent to, and by appeal
to, facts other than those which they measure, the prescriptive laws of the norma-
tive social sciences can measure the facts of these sciences without begging the
question or confusing the "ought" of these facts with their "is."
There are suggestions in De Jouvenel's extensive analysis that he in fact uses
this method. His conclusions probably carry the weight they do only because
such is the case.
His final major section concerns "Liberty." It opens with a chapter on
Descartes' cognitive theory of knowledge and his concept of the person. Clearly,
the propositions of these subjects are indicative sentences. From them, De
Jouvenel derives the modern prescriptive political and legal sentences concerning
the relation of the political sovereign to law. His next chapter is on Hobbes.
This chapter logically relates the prescriptive sentences of the Leviathan to
the indicative sentences of Hobbes' conception of men and nature, logically
antecedent to the origin of government and law. It will be recalled that De
Jouvenel's argument against the modern theory of the political sovereign, which
was found valid, was derived from Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness. The fallacy rests on an indicative sentence in epistemology and the
philosophy of natural science. One must conclude, therefore, that with respect
to De Jouvenel's method of verifying the normative laws of political and legal
science, his practice is superior to his theory.
It remains to combine the suggested method for exhibiting the implicit
cognitive character of man-made measuring imperative sentences of politics and
law with De Jouvenel's theory of the origin of political associations. His theory,
again, is that such associations are effected by "the summons of a man"; they
do not merely arise from a spontaneous, theoretically unconscious converging
of individual members, nor are they created solely by means of external force.
To this thesis is added the condition that a political association is preserved or
changed in a cognitively correct way only under the summons or guidance
of a single man or a few men. What is the significance of this emphasis upon
the role of a small number of men, as well as the role of the majority, in any
political community which escapes tyranny?
De Jouvenel's point is that since the normative prescriptions of political,
ethical and legal science are cognitively confirmable rather than arbitrary
imperatives, the method for determining their scientific validity calls for ex-
pertness. Hence the requirement of the leadership or summons of the few
as well as the free assent of the many. Consequently, majority assent is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition for just government.
At first, De Jouvenel's theory may appear incompatible with democracy. The
slightest reflection on the method and theories of natural science shows, how-
ever, that such is not the case. The very essence of popular acceptance of
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Einstein's relativity theory and of quantum mechanics is that the majority
of men who give their consent to these theories do not independently make
the observations, the experiments and the logical deductions from axiomatic-
ally constructed postulates which are necessary to confirm these theories.
Instead, they depend upon experts and upon experts checking the experts.
In short, the many are brought to their assent by "the summons of a man"
or a few men. No one would say that this procedure in natural science is
undemocratic. To make the norms of social science cognitive in this sense is
no more undemocratic. Even so, the principle of pluralism in its bearing upon
the open society, noted earlier, must be kept in mind.
This conception of political association places the restrictions of verified
knowledge upon the impulsive assents, approvals and not infrequent dema-
gog-uery of the many. Furthermore, it avoids the error present in contemporary
democracy of producing quantitative conformity at the expense of variety,
important chance variations, and creative individual originality. The expert
insures the creative advance, the empirical verifiability and the quality which
comes from thinking through the parodoxical problem present in any law
which is made by, yet measures, men. The many free people, any one of whom
may become an expert, provide the assent without which the law suggested by
the scientific experts would be a law of tyrants. The many provide the assent,
also, without which the law of the community would fail to carry moral or
legal obligation for its subjects. Finally, the requirement of scientific verifi-
ability for the normative prescriptions of any just law provides the cognitive
component, located outside the sovereign, that is necessary to bring the demo-
cratic legislative sovereign under the rule of law. The citizens of the United
States should not find it difficult to understand and appreciate this theory of
political association since the government of the United States was created
through popular assent to the summons of a few men.
Apparently, then, the paradox of political and legal obligation can be re-
solved-but only if a method other than one suggested by De Jouvenel is used
to determine which of several normative ethical, political and legal prescriptive
theories is the scientifically confirmed one.
Two conclusions follow. First, normative subjects, such as politics and law,
can be scientific only if they become philosophical in the suggested manner
through analysis of the prescriptive, imperative sentences of policy decisions
and judicial judgments to exhibit their implicit cognitive assumptions in episte-
mology, the philosophy of natural science and natural psychology, and through
subsequent testing of these indicative sentences against the empirical data of
man and nature logically antecedent to, and independent of, the artifacts of
man-made and man-measured cultural behavior and institutions. Second, one
cannot assume, as De Jouvenel does, that the cognitively correct choice of a
political and legal theory must be made from the traditional theories and
cultural artifacts depicted in history, least of all in Western history. The
Orient has discovered and applied important theories also, as exponents of
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American legal realism have recently confirmed independently. 2' Still more
important, notable advances have recently been made in empirically verified
theories of nature and neurological man. Analysis of the verified theories of
contemporary mathematical physics has exhibited far more complex and di-
versified types of conceptual meaning than contemporary legal analysis or tra-
ditional political and legal theory has envisaged. An adequate cognitive theory
of government and law is more likely, therefore, to be ahead of us rather
than behind us.
Even so, the paradox of political and legal obligation seems to be resolvable
only along the lines previously mentioned. Unless man-made normative laws
are scientifically verified or verifiable, they do not have the objectivity necessary
to impose an obligation upon both sovereign and subject. But if their verifica-
tion consists in their conformity to the de facto "is" of human behavior and
man-made institutions, then they cannot measure, they are not normative.
Only if the normative laws of social science are verified by appeal to facts
logically antecedent to and independent of those which they measure can the
paradox of political and legal obligation be resolved.
F. S. C. NORTHROPt
THE UNFINISHED STORY OF ALGER Hiss. By Fred J. Cook. New York:
William Morrow & Co., 1958. Pp. 184. $3.50.
IT has long been a cantankerous conviction of mine that nobody writes about
legal stuff for non-legal eyediences with such consummate ineptness as do law-
yers. The bench-and-bar boys, however articulate, can never resist, when writ-
ing for laymen, the flat, solemn style that poses as profundity, the cautious
and irrelevant qualification of statement, the whole linguistic jungle of legal-
dygook that is their chief stock in trade. This crusty conviction of mine was
recently strengthened by my reading of two books on precisely the same sub-
ject, based on almost identical material. One was written by a lawyer-or
rather (lawyerly qualification) by an ex-lawyer; his name is Alger Hiss and
his book is titled In the Court of Public Opinion; reviewing it-in the Texas
Law Review, if anybody cares-I said that it was just as surgically sterile as
its title implies; it is. The other book was written by a veteran New York
crime reporter who, so far as I know, never set seat in a law school-unless
perhaps a criminal suspect was around; his name is Fred J. Cook and his book
is titled The Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss. The Hiss story may be un-
finished, but the Cook story will not be by anyone who starts to read it; it is
that good.
21. Northrop, The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism,
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